the twentieth century, is striking in its breadth: racial zoning, discriminatory home finance programs, restrictive housing covenants, legally mandated segregation, and gerrymandered school zone lines, among others. Within the extensive literature on segregation, metaphors and frameworks of division such as "city-splitting," the "racial divide," and "sorting out" are most prominent. 1 Analytically, these terms reinforce the nearly universally held idea that segregation both turns on and helps constitute social and spatial divisions and separations between groups.
With its emphasis placed squarely on the powerful array of structural forces underpinning racial segregation, the literature on city-splitting is simply indispensable to understanding the history and mechanics of the color line. Nevertheless, it is incomplete without a more robust recognition of the varied modes of Jim Crow and the multiple rationales that have supported segregation.
2 During the same early-twentieth-century decades in which modern citysplitting practices proliferated, education officials, drawing inspiration from the ideas of progressive leaders from urban planning and other fields, also embraced segregation. However, they did so with multiple aims in mind. As did many Americans in the early twentieth century, these practitioners and thinkers viewed racial categories as meaningful markers of innate difference, and they operated within a broader milieu that saw neighborhood and school segregation as protection not only for property values and white educational privilege, but also for basic social bonds. When these educators took up civic reform projects-as when they searched for physical and social structures that would build community and create what they deemed to be favorable relationships between people-segregation remained central to their vision. They wanted to join and bond community members together, and their racial ideology led them to imagine segregation as a necessary precursor to achieving that social cohesion. To bring their goals to fruition, education officials and other policy makers employed a variety of city-splitting techniques, but they often did so in the name of community building. Indeed, segregationist practice in the twentieth-century United States developed and flourished not through one single rationale or mold, but an interlocking mix of forms and ideological justifications. Simply stated, the color line derived from acts of joining as well as splitting.
The full breadth of segregationist practice in the United States has been hard to perceive in part because the city-splitting literature has focused too heavily on housing as the primary venue for Jim Crow, the one from which other patterns, particularly segregation in schooling, follow. 3 In reality, though, housing and school policies have almost always worked together as part of broader networks of metropolitan segregation. Even in the South, where legally enforced Jim Crow schools persisted well into the post-World War II era, housing and education policies often worked in tandem to maintain the color line. 4 Rather than simply following the dynamics of residential segregation, schools have consistently helped define the boundaries of the segregated neighborhood. Schools and housing, far from existing in a hierarchical relationship, have long been mutually constitutive entities.
Tracing the interactions between housing and schooling also undermines the commonplace notion of de facto segregation. As a growing literature points out, the narrative of de facto segregation falsely locates school segregation's cause in housing markets, and, furthermore, inaccurately identifies this residential segregation to be the product of private, rather than state, action. In truth, though, the segregated schools and neighborhoods that spread throughout the United States during the twentieth century grew out of a combination of government policies and private acts of discrimination perpetrated in both educational and residential spheres. Segregationist joining and community building often operated at the nexus of housing and schools, although local actors and legal discourse often veiled these practices in the exculpatory language of de facto segregation. 5 The history of "community education" in Flint, Michigan, exemplifies the paired embrace of segregation as joining and segregation as splitting. In the company town of Flint, the world manufacturing headquarters of the General Motors Corporation (GM), planners, policy makers, and business leaders sought a range of benefits from strengthening community ties through segregation-everything from drawing immigrants into citizenship to undermining union power. Drawing on popular ideas of social and educational reform, they created a highly portable and deeply influential program of community education that linked segregation powerfully across housing and schooling. Between the 1930s and the 1970s, Flint's well-documented and extensive community education effort became a model for hundreds of school districts nationwide. Community education casts in high relief the patterns of segregationist joining and splitting at work together in numerous other American cities. Yet members of the Flint Board of Education, like their peers in many other places, obscured their divisive actions by largely avoiding discussions of race.
Even when forced to address racial discrimination and segregation, school officials concealed their policies by blaming de facto segregation, insisting that racial separation in the city's schoolhouses resulted from private housing discrimination. School segregation, they maintained, was both legally and morally innocent.
Initially, such defenses of segregation were largely confined to states outside of the South, many of which had laws explicitly banning most forms of Jim Crow. For much of the early twentieth century, in fact, the myth of de facto segregation formed the heart of a broader narrative of regional exceptionalism-one that effectively defended racial segregation in the North and West by categorically differentiating it from the legal Jim Crow that reigned in the South. Over time, however, as the South's system of Jim Crow met social, political, and legal challenges and patterns of regional distinctiveness gave way to new policy-driven modes of racial separation that were thoroughly national in scope, white southerners joined their peers in Flint and other parts of the United States in deploying the myth of de facto segregation to mask the government's role in upholding the color line. For all of its local variations, then, Flint's story is in many ways reflective of a broader set of national experiences. 6 Despite the rosier cast of talk about communal ties and neighborhood bonds, segregation in the name of joining, whether in Flint or elsewhere, was no less malevolent than segregation that made splitting its more explicit goal. Indeed, segregationist joining remained a fundamental means of exercising power and domination, a mode of drawing together a categorically defined group around key resources that that group could control and monopolize.
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Recognizing the diversity of arguments made for racial separation illustrates how deeply woven into American society segregation has been. Segregation as joining bridged the space between individual racism and the structural techniques of city-splitting, shaping human interaction in ways that sanctioned both. Together, splitting and joining formed a most durable web of segregationist rationales and practices. Board of Education with operating illegally segregated public schools in violation of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. 8 The complaint outlined how, for decades, school board members had maintained a separate but unequal education system through a combination of exclusionary employment rules, racially biased school location and pupil transfer policies, discriminatory construction and real estate practices, and deliberately gerrymandered student attendance boundaries. Although school officials vehemently denied the accusations, federal reports left little room for doubt about the local government's pivotal role in maintaining segregation. 9 The school segregation that federal investigators belatedly discovered in Flint in 1975 had its roots in a wildly popular community-building initiative that first took shape during the Great Depression. During the early decades of the twentieth century, Flint, a quintessential company town, rose to prominence as the manufacturing hub for General Motors. As America's national obsession with automobiles took root, Flint attracted tens of thousands of working-class migrants to labor in its many factories. Between 1900 and 1930, the city's population soared from 13,103 to 156,492, making Flint the eleventh fastest growing municipality in the United States. 10 Although the Vehicle City's growing economy attracted migrants from virtually every part of the nation (and world), the Flint of the early twentieth century was less diverse than most urban centers in the United States. As late as 1930, over 80% of Flint's residents were native-born whites, most of them working-class Protestants. Only a tiny fraction of the city's total population-approximately 1%-were of either Hispanic or Asian descent. For their part, the approximately 5,600 African Americans who lived in Flint in 1930-all but a few of whom inhabited two segregated neighborhoods on the near north and south sides-represented just 3.6% of the Vehicle City's relatively homogeneous Depression-era population.
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In the mid-1930s, in response to the city's rapid population growth and a series of polarizing labor organizing drives led by members of the newly formed United Automobile Workers (UAW) union, General Motors executive Charles Stewart Mott and Frank Manley, a local educator, launched a program of "community education" that remade Flint's public school buildings into neighborhood civic centers. Like other urban reformers during this era, Mott and Manley hoped to build a vibrant public sphere that nourished social intimacy, personal improvement, economic productivity, and community spirit in an increasingly privatized and socially divided urban space.
12 To accomplish those broad objectives, representatives of the Mott FoundationCharles Stewart's well-endowed private philanthropy-forged a close bond with the board of education that brought millions of dollars per year in corporate funding to Flint's public schools.
13 On the strength of that partnership, Mott, Manley, and their local supporters implemented community education Schools, Housing, and the Many Modes of Jim Crow throughout the Vehicle City during the postwar decades. By 1970, Mott and his associates had helped to spread Flint's community education programming to over 300 public school systems nationwide.
14 Although Manley and Mott often took credit for inventing the concept of community education, the idea was clearly not their own. 15 Rather, it was the product of the efforts of John Dewey, Clarence Perry, and other intellectuals and professionals in various branches of Progressive-era social reform who sought to place schools at the center of urban life. They saw in schools-both as physical facilities and social institutions-the opportunity to foster the communal ethos, the associational ties and bonds of democratic citizenship, that many of their day worried were threatened by the large, diverse industrial city. Schools could be, in their view, a crucial space for joining people of all ages together to form community. For his part, Dewey endorsed tight schoolcommunity relationships in the name of democratic citizenship as well as more meaningful learning opportunities for students. Perry built on these ideas with pragmatic calls for the "wider use" of school buildings as spaces for community gathering and learning, for adults as well as children. 16 As Perry explored the concept of the wider use of school buildings, he began to develop ideas about the physical and social conditions that fostered "associational community." Ideas first worked out around schools as community centers later helped shape his efforts on city playgrounds and his influential "neighborhood unit" concept. In writing about the neighborhood unit, a cityplanning paradigm that located the school at the geographic and social center of a neighborhood, Perry was explicit in identifying "racial and social homogeneity" as a necessary condition for community joining. 17 Although it was not clear whether Perry imagined social homogeneity to require ethnic homogeneity, it was abundantly evident that his ideas sanctioned the exclusion of African Americans.
18
By the time that Manley arrived in Flint in 1927, Perry's influential writings advocating the wider use of schoolhouses-for voting, recreation, adult learning, and more-had been circulating in southeast Michigan for over 2 decades. Prefiguring later calls for schools-based "social centers," the Flint Socialist Party's 1912 electoral platform included a plank stating, "School buildings shall be open for the use of the public, when not in use for school purposes." 19 Although Manley had begun promoting community education soon after his arrival in Flint, his ideas did not take hold locally until the mid-1930s, just when auto workers in the Vehicle City and elsewhere were formally embracing industrial unionism. In the summer of 1935, only weeks after the UAW's formation, Manley persuaded Charles Stewart Mott, GM's largest stockholder and a longtime resident of the city, to cosponsor a pilot program in community education in five of Flint's all-white elementary schools. 22 The program attracted well over 5,000 participants per week in its inaugural year and helped to reduce juvenile delinquency in the city by approximately 70%.
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Initially Manley and Mott focused exclusively on the issues of juvenile delinquency and child safety. However, events in 1936 and 1937 compelled the two men to reassess the nature of the city's problems. On December 30, 1936, the Flint Sit-Down Strike erupted in GM's Fisher Body 1 plant and spread quickly throughout the city. One of the most consequential labor struggles in American history, the strike pitted members of the newly formed UAW against GM in a battle for union recognition. After 44 grueling days, the dispute ended on February 11, 1937, when GM agreed to recognize the union and engage in collective bargaining. Inspired by the victory, workers throughout the nation launched a wave of industrial organizing drives in the aftermath of the Flint sit-down. 24 However, the battle in Flint also served to galvanize Mott and other industrialists. Mott reacted harshly to the news of factory occupations in Flint, viewing the UAW as a protosocialist threat to private property and the rule of law. 25 More broadly, though, he and other business leaders throughout the United States found the urban milieu of the 1930s deeply troubling. 26 When Mott first arrived in Michigan in 1906, Flint was a city known more for its horse-drawn carriages and small-town atmosphere than for automobiles and strikes. To Mott, it seemed to be a small, homogeneous, and relatively harmonious city. Indisputably, it was also a company town, or what one UAW acSchools, Housing, and the Many Modes of Jim Crow tivist referred to as a "giant stronghold of feudal capitalism."
27 By the late 1930s, however, Mott saw a fractured city. 28 Like Manley, Mott looked to community schools-particularly those that offered corporate-approved curricula-as a means to undermine the UAW's newfound power. The two men also sought to foster a greater sense of personal responsibility among all Flint residents while simultaneously restoring a sense of civic solidarity within the city's segregated neighborhoods. "We must build back to community activities to get people to know their neighbors and bring about a wholesome, small-town atmosphere in a big city," Mott claimed. 29 To pursue those objectives, Mott and Manley made the decision to expand their inchoate community education initiative and become more active in the governance of the public schools.
As part of that effort, the two men began promoting their supporters for school leadership positions and endorsing sympathetic candidates, many of them local executives from GM, Citizens Bank, and other companies, for the at-large, citywide races for the Flint Board of Education. Their goal, in Manley's words, was to get "the real leaders of our community on the board of education and in other influential positions."
30 That strategy first began to bear fruit in the mid-1940s, when local corporate leaders and GM loyalists such as Arthur H. Sarvis, Ralph M. Freeman, and Harold W. Woughter gained a majority on the school board. Soon after that, board members granted official representation to the Mott Foundation by appointing Frank Manley to the position of assistant superintendent of community education. Once in a position of power, Manley and other representatives of the Mott Foundation quickly spread community education and a GM-approved vocationally centered curriculum throughout the city. 31 As noted in one survey of Flint schools, "Frank J. Manley is, for all practical purposes, the superintendent of Flint's schools and through him the influence of the foundation is applied . . . to every sector of school programming." 32 Under Manley's leadership, Flint's neighborhood elementary schools, of which there were 27 in 1950, quickly became traditional schoolhouses by day and "lighted community centers" during the evenings, on weekends, and in the summer. Just as in Rochester, New York, and other cities that experimented with schools-based social centers during the Progressive Era, Flint's community education program helped to create a bustling, energetic civic culture.
33 From the mid-1930s until the mid-1970s, Flint residents descended in droves upon their neighborhood schools for organized recreation, adult education, vocational training, free health screenings, and a wide variety of civic events. According to one enthusiastic participant, community schools were "like country clubs for the working class."
34 Organized in keeping with the "neighborhood unit" ideal of houses no more than one-half mile from the local elementary school (at least in theory), community school facilities began dotting the urban landscape in the 1930s and 1940s. They were the concrete and steel manifestations of a sweeping neighborhood-based social revitalization and development strategy that touched nearly every resident of Flint.
When Mott and Manley first implemented their community education initiative in the 1930s, Flint was overwhelmingly white-a city in which African Americans accounted for less than 4% of the total population. Between 1940 and 1960, however, as the local economy boomed and General Motors opened new industrial facilities throughout the Flint metropolitan area, the city's black population rose sharply from 6,559 to 34,521, an increase of over 400%. 35 As the city's black population soared and African Americans began moving into previously segregated neighborhoods and school attendance zones, racial conflicts often ensued and Flint began to resemble other racially diverse urban centers with contested social geographies. 36 Community education leaders responded to such shifts by launching an active campaign to maintain racial segregation within local schools and neighborhoods. In their quest to implement a segregationist vision of camaraderie and neighborliness among city residents of all ages, they created new programs and policies that hardened and institutionalized patterns of racial separation, academic disadvantage, and social inequality. From the start, in fact, racial segregation and racist resourceallocation policies were crucial, if often unspoken, components of Flint's community education program. 37 As critics often pointed out, the city's deeply entrenched patterns of residential segregation often led to segregated community schools.
38 Yet pupil segregation was not simply an unintended outcome of the turn toward community education and neighborhood-based schools in a residentially divided city. Instead, government actions helped to maintain the educational, residential, social, and recreational color lines together. Beyond the school segregation enforced by restrictive real estate covenants, federal mortgage redlining, and other city-splitting housing and development policies, deliberate school board actions also helped to preserve and even extend the color line.
Unlike large sections of the South, however, where explicit legal segregation persisted until well into the 1960s, many northern and western cities such as Flint, Boston, and Seattle exemplified an often more hidden, administratively driven mode of school segregation. 39 Despite the existence of an 1867 state law forbidding racial segregation in Michigan's public schools, Mott Foundation officials and members of the Flint Board of Education repeatedly manipulated student transfer policies, built new facilities in segregated neighborhoods, and gerrymandered attendance boundaries-all in an attempt to maintain the color line. As an outgrowth of its community schools philosophy, the board of education crafted school construction, boundary, and attendance policies that at times kept white and black neighbors in separate schools, often in the name of enhancing community bonds. In some instances, schools were thus even more segregated than the segregated neighborhoods they served. Although leaders of the Mott Foundation and members of the board of education seldom spoke openly about their motivations in enacting such policies, their record is clear.
On dozens of occasions during the decades bracketing World War II, school officials deliberately gerrymandered attendance districts to maintain segregation and preserve what they viewed as an essential community-building program. In short, they pursued a city-splitting agenda in the name of joining-of building stronger community ties. As a prime example, in the 1950s and early 1960s, members of the school board repeatedly redrew attendance boundaries to maintain pupil segregation in the racially contested neighborhoods between Clark and Pierce Elementary Schools. In 1952, the school board opened Pierce with an all-white enrollment in one of the city's most exclusive and segregated east side neighborhoods. As was the case with several other schools that opened in the 1950s, the board had an opportunity to integrate Pierce from the outset by doing nothing more than adhering to a strict geographic policy of neighborhood schools. If the board had honored its own guideline that children, wherever possible, should attend the schools closest to their homes, then Pierce would have drawn a significant number of African-American pupils from the nearby neighborhoods of Sugar Hill and Elm Park. Prior to Pierce's opening, these students attended Clark Elementary, a decaying, overcrowded structure with a black enrollment of over 95%. Despite the fact that many of the Sugar Hill and Elm Park students lived closest to the new building, school board members excluded them from the Pierce attendance district. The board also refused all transfer requests from black pupils, even though Pierce did not reach full capacity until the early 1960s. Moreover, over the loud objections of numerous black parents, board members repeatedly redistricted Pierce during the 1950s and early 1960s in order to maintain the school's all-white enrollment. "They drew boundaries around houses," Ruth Scott remembered, "down the middle of the street . . . when blacks moved onto a street, they would change the boundaries." As a direct consequence of the board's decisions, Pierce remained all white at the end of the 1950s while Clark's black enrollment soared to 99.5%. In practice, the rapidly shifting, oddly shaped boundaries that separated Pierce, Clark, and other segregated Flint schools eviscerated community education's claim to assigning students based on a colorblind ideal of proximity (see fig. 2 ). 40 When the school board announced the opening of Stewart Elementary in 1955, it again found itself facing the Pierce-Clark segregation issue. Located one-half mile south of Pierce and three-quarters of a mile east of Clark, Stewart served Elm Park, Sugar Hill, and several other integrated but racially transitional residential areas south of the city's well-known Lapeer Road color line. Prior to Stewart's opening, the board had blocked black pupils from these areas from transferring to Pierce, choosing instead to house nearly 300 African- American students from the overcrowded Clark building in dilapidated temporary structures. Through the careful drawing of Stewart's boundaries, the board relieved such overcrowding at Clark while maintaining a segregated white population at Pierce. In order to exclude all blacks living in the area from the Pierce district, the board once again violated its policy on proximity by extending the Stewart boundary over one and a half miles to the north and east, resulting in an 80% black enrollment at Stewart while Pierce remained under capacity and all white. In effect, the construction of the Stewart School allowed the board to ease overcrowding at Clark by sending white pupils to Pierce and black pupils to Stewart, regardless of their proximity to either.
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For those white pupils who still found themselves enrolled at Stewart, school officials established separate classrooms for white and black children. 42 As a rule, commitment to "racial and social homogeneity" proved a more powerful factor in defining community than did geographic proximity. In the cases of Pierce, Clark, Stewart, and other schools serving racially mixed areas, student attendance zones often separated children of different races who lived in close proximity. Segregationist school districting practices had an even wider impact, however. Because community education leaders looked to bring families and neighbors together via their programming, adult participation in community school programs generally followed child assignment. The gerrymandering of student attendance zones thus affected virtually all participants in community education. At the same time, Mott programs helped to undermine the stability of racially integrated neighborhoods by encouraging parents and other adults to interact primarily with community members whose children attended the same school, while excluding those whose children attended different schools.
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On February 9, 1954 , just 3 months prior to the release of the Brown verdict, the Flint Board of Education, in an attempt to accommodate the thousands of new pupils that had enrolled in the system since the close of World War II, established new school boundaries throughout the city. Though it would take nearly 20 years for the federal government to acknowledge the illegality of the 1954 boundary reorganization, the board's plan clearly expanded segregation, particularly in elementary schools, which were the principal sites of community education. This was especially obvious on the northeast side of the city, where the 1954 plan split the integrated enrollment of Roosevelt Elementary between the official school site on Thetford Road and a group of temporary structures located 1½ miles to the north. For the main Roosevelt building, located in a majority-black neighborhood near a massive complex of GM factories, the board drew boundaries that resulted in a 95% black enrollment. However, to the temporary structures north of Roosevelt, the board assigned 50 white pupils and perhaps one black student. The 1954 plan thus split the Roosevelt enrollment along both racial and geographic lines, establishing separate facilities for white and black students from the same school. 44 Angered by these and other segregationist school boundary reorganizations, UAW officials Robert Carter, Norman Bully, and Earl Crompton drafted a joint letter in September 1955 accusing the school board of violating the US Constitution. Their letter and many others like it went unanswered, however. 45 In other parts of the city, board members practiced segregation by allowing racial transfers, repeatedly tweaking school boundaries, tracking students, erecting temporary classrooms, and collaborating with members of the real estate industry. 46 On the northwest side, school administrators often turned to temporary structures known as "primary units" to preserve segregation in the face of racial transition and student enrollment increases (see fig. 3 ). Unlike the temporary classrooms operated by many other boards of education in the United States during the postwar era, which often abutted permanent school buildings, Flint's primary units sat in residential neighborhoods across the city. 47 The units resembled small, single-family ranch homes, with each structure housing one classroom, and they were virtually indistinguishable from surrounding residential landscapes. School board members promoted the units as fis -FIG. 3. -A primary unit on Flint's west side. A color version of this figure is available online. Photograph by Andrew R. Highsmith, 2006. cally sound solutions to the problem of overcrowding, arguing that they could be resold as single-family homes upon the final resolution of enrollment spikes. Because primary units allowed the board to maintain pupil separation without shifting attendance boundaries, they were also useful tools for upholding the color line. Between 1950 and 1966, the board of education oversaw the construction of 116 such structures, many of them in newly integrated sections of the northwest side. Although board members could have resolved overcrowding and pupil segregation there through limited boundary shifts between Martin, Jefferson, Pierson, and Gundry Elementary Schools, instead they opened 41 primary units. By 1959, the board's decision had resulted in an especially glaring disjuncture between Pierson and Jefferson. Although only one-half mile separated the two facilities, Pierson contained an all-white enrollment of 909 pupils in a building intended to house 1,301 students. By comparison, Jefferson-which claimed at least seven primary units-had a total enrollment of 980 pupils, 954 of whom were African American, even though the main school building housed only 906 children (the remaining 74 students were assigned to primary units). Primary units made it possible to maintain such strict forms of segregation even when traditional school buildings reached their capacity.
48
As in Atlanta, Chicago, and other urban centers, the rapid increase in Flint's black population during the 1940s and 1950s placed extraordinary pressure on the residential color line. 49 Despite the population changes, however, leaders from the Flint Board of Education, with support from Mott Foundation officials, worked hard to manipulate school zone lines in favor of a segregated vision of community. Prior to the war, Saginaw Street formed a nearly impermeable barrier between the solidly black and transitional neighborhoods of the city's North End and the all-white sections of Flint's west and northwest sides. However, as the dilapidated neighborhoods of the North End reached their capacity in the 1950s, black families began seeking out housing west of Saginaw Street. Occasionally, African-American homebuyers-especially small business owners, professionals, and others with ample funds-were able to pierce through the color line by purchasing homes outside of the ghetto in cash or through informal, often deeply exploitative private real estate agreements known as "land contracts." 50 These residential movements generated many new opportunities for educational integration, especially in the junior and senior high school districts that served larger zones, but the board responded to such population shifts by continuing to gerrymander. In April 1954, board members unveiled a new boundary plan for junior high schools. The plan included an oddly shaped, zigzagging attendance boundary on the northwest side that pulled handfuls of white students into the Longfellow school district while pushing black pupils into the neighboring Emerson zone. The board's hard-to-follow boundary line resulted in a 100% white enrollment at Longfellow that held throughout the 1950s. At Emerson, by contrast, the boundary created a black student body that comprised 23.9% of the school's overall enrollment. As in other instances, the board allowed white students from Emerson to switch to Longfellow while denying black students the same privilege. Spatially, the LongfellowEmerson boundary represented another preferencing of ideas of segregated community over geographic proximity. Both black and white students often traveled to the more distant of two facilities. According to a 1958 editorial that appeared in the Bronze Reporter, the city's leading black newspaper, "If children were simply sent to the schools nearest them, we would find much fewer allNegro and all-White schools." 51 As black families from Flint's overcrowded ghettos moved into white neighborhoods in the 1950s, the board of education worked feverishly, if less successfully, to maintain segregation. For its junior and senior high schools, which drew students from larger and thus more racially mixed sections of the city, the board could not impose strict segregation and thus managed boundaries and transfers to minimize interracial enrollments. At the high school level, for instance, the board's attendance boundaries served to concentrate black pupils at Northern and Northwestern High Schools while diluting African-American enrollments at Central and, later, Southwestern High Schools. For younger children, however, the board continued to plan for rigid segregation wherever possible, even if that meant requiring elementary pupils to cross major traffic thoroughfares and attend schools outside of their immediate areas. 52 The racial imbalances between contiguous school attendance zones were especially visible in the city's North End. There, board policies left the neighboring schools of Lewis and Fairview with stark demographic contrasts even though the two buildings were only 1 mile apart. Located west of the Flint River in the St. John neighborhood, Fairview had a 100% black enrollment during the 1959-60 academic year. That same year, Lewis School, located just east of the river in a working-class white neighborhood, contained only one black student out of 712 pupils. With a capacity enrollment of only 661 students, Lewis was severely overcrowded in spite of its proximity-and easy access, via vehicle and pedestrian bridges-to Fairview. However, the school board refused to allow transfers between the two buildings.
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The pattern of overcrowded white schools adjacent to integrated and allblack facilities replicated itself across the city as the residential color line shifted to the north and west. Yet the school board would not relieve pupil overcrowding by breaching the color line. Such refusals often resulted in severe imbalances. At Fairview, for instance, the outward migration of white students during the 1940s and 1950s reduced the student-teacher ratio to 27:1. The ratio at nearby Kearsley, an all-white school, was 36:1, however. When parents criticized education officials for their inability to solve school overcrowding in the white neighborhoods surrounding St. John, board members framed seg-regationist policies as a form of compensatory education for underprivileged black students: "Occasionally," a board report asserted, "socioeconomic factors make a lower pupil-teacher ratio desirable for a given school." 54 Despite a great deal of evidence implicating Mott Foundation representatives and board of education members for the maintenance of Jim Crow facilities, education officials accepted no blame for any type of segregation and, moreover, argued that the Brown ruling did not apply to Flint because Michigan law prohibited segregated schools. In defense of their policies, board members, Mott Foundation personnel, and school superintendent William Early consistently maintained that community education programs were vital to maintaining civic order and social harmony and that "de facto" segregation in the schools stemmed solely from segregated housing. During a 1966 speech, Early delivered a classic defense of de facto segregation in which he claimed, "The degree of racial imbalance that exists in some of the elementary schools is a result of long-established patterns of housing segregation in the city of Flint." 55 Clearly, Early spoke the truth in linking Flint's rigid residential color line with pupil segregation. However, residential segregation could not explain the policies that maintained the color line on the city's rapidly shifting racial frontiers; nor could it account for the school board's involvement in preserving segregation within the local housing market.
In addition to gerrymandering attendance boundaries, operating temporary classrooms, and approving illegal racial transfers, members of the Flint Board of Education also used their partnerships with residential developers and federal housing officials to ensure the racial exclusivity of new subdivisions and school facilities. On several occasions, members of the board formally collaborated with local builders and representatives of the Federal Housing Administration in the planning and construction of new schools at the center of racially restricted neighborhoods.
56 These developments at once illustrated the inseparable nature of segregation in housing and schooling, the fallacy of claims of "de facto" segregation, and the interrelationship between segregationist splitting and joining.
According to legal scholar Davison Douglas, such forms of state-sanctioned school segregation "persisted in open defiance of state law in many northern communities until the late 1940s and early 1950s." 57 In Flint, however, these sorts of policies were even more durable than Douglas imagined, continuing throughout the civil rights era. By the close of the 1960s, Flint's schools-like those in New York City, Detroit, and other urban centers-were thus profoundly segregated. 58 Of the 42 public elementary schools operating in the city in 1970, nine contained all-white student populations, while three additional buildings claimed fewer than 10 black pupils each. In addition, 10 of the city's elementary schools had black student majorities of greater than 90%. With a 1970 elementary student population of 27,540 children, 39% of whom were African American, the Flint Public Schools operated only five integrated elementary facilities, defined as buildings with pupil enrollments approximating, within 10 percentage points, the racial demographics of the system as a whole. Furthermore, between 1951 and 1970, the number of black pupils attending majority-black schools remained essentially unchanged.
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Not coincidentally, white participation in and support for community education reached its zenith during the postwar era, at the very same time as members of the board of education and the Mott Foundation were engaging in their most active city-splitting campaigns. In June 1950, voters expressed their support for their local public schools and community education by overwhelmingly endorsing a $7 million bond issue-the first such victory in the city's history. 60 Flush with unprecedented public funds, board members moved quickly to erect new schools and expand community education. Between 1950 and 1960, the school board oversaw the construction of eight new elementary schools, seven of which contained only white students, and launched scores of new community programs. In response, white enrollments in Mott-sponsored activities exploded. By the mid-1950s, nearly one-half of Flint's 200,000 residents were participating in community education programming, which included athletic leagues, health and self-improvement workshops, and over 1,200 adult education courses offered in 54 community school centers in the city (see fig. 4 ). "At our house," one white resident noted, "we just take it for granted that we are all going to take Mott Foundation classes."
61 And while gerrymandered school attendance boundaries kept most Mott programs sharply segregated along racial lines, participants in community education ranged across the demographic spectrum. In a 1956 article on the Mott program, an author from Coronet magazine cheered the city's esprit de corps and credited community schools for making Flint the "Happiest Town in Michigan." 62 In similar fashion, a journalist from Reader's Digest announced that "Flint's Gone Crazy over Culture," while a writer from Family Circle magazine referred to Mott's "life-saving, blues-curing plan" that had people "dancing in the streets." 63 The government policies that split Flint and most other American cities into segregated neighborhoods and schools facilitated a decades-long wave of segregationist joining among whites. But the postwar era's surge in civic activity came at the price of heightened segregation.
In Flint, school boundaries shaped segregated communities-both in space and in the minds of residents. By the end of the 1960s, the board's racist policies had significantly remapped neighborhood boundaries throughout the city, undermining even limited forms of residential integration. Because so-called neighborhood elementary schools served as the focal points for most civic activities, the gerrymandering of student boundaries and other segregationist practices affected nearly everyone in the city, regardless of age, gender, or race. In an attempt to communicate the spatial absurdity of Flint's neighborhood schools, Edgar Holt, a leader from the Flint chapter of the NAACP, resorted to using supernatural metaphors: "There were magic lines for racial discrimination." "The Flint Board of Education used these magic racial lines in establishing school boundaries as if they were sacred."
64 As Holt no doubt understood, the boundaries of Flint's "neighborhood schools" were constantly changing geographic constructs designed (and redesigned) to reverse even modest breaches of the residential color line. Having claimed to be organized on an objective basis of proximity, community schools were instead imagined communities dependent on local officials' manipulation of the city's geography. 65 Widespread belief in the concept of de facto segregation played a significant role in the persistence of segregation in Flint and other cities. For many opponents of desegregation across the country, the de facto formulation provided discursive, political, and legal space to defend government-backed segregation as an accidental outcome of color-blind neighborhood schools programs that segregated not by state action but by individual, market-based housing decisions. In 1970, Flint's congressional representative, Donald Riegle, crystallized the false dichotomies that helped to shield Flint from school desegregation. "In dealing with segregation," he argued, "a distinction has been made between de jure and de facto segregation. The former means intentional segregation. . . . De facto segregation results from housing patterns." 66 Effectively, the language of de facto segregation allowed leaders such as Riegle, William Early, and other officials, many of whom supported the Supreme Court's Brown ruling, to denounce Jim Crow in the South while supporting it at home. The truth, though, is that the segregated school and neighborhood boundaries that took shape in Flint during the postwar era had their roots in a set of housing, urban development, and educational policies that looked a great deal like those in other sections of the country, including the South, where, in the wake of the Brown ruling, policy-driven forms of school and residential segregation supplanted legally mandated forms of Jim Crow. Flint stood out from many other cities, however, for the clarity and durability of its local leaders' commitments to segregation as splitting and joining.
Having depended on segregation, community education in Flint proved incompatible with desegregation. Shortly after the federal government ordered the desegregation of Flint's schools in 1975, leaders from the Mott Foundation summarily canceled the program. 67 According to an April 1977 position paper authored by foundation trustees, the idea to end the school district and foundation's 42-year relationship stemmed from a desire to transfer financial responsibility for community education to the taxpaying public. "If a program is assisted by a foundation long enough for its constituents to determine its value to them," the trustees claimed, "the program should in most cases pass to them for on-going funding."
68 By severing the official ties between the foundation and the public school system, trustees hoped to serve a larger purpose, though. The decision also reflected a desire among the foundation's leadership "to give Indeed, after sustaining a decades-long partnership with the city and its people, the Mott Foundation announced the end of its community education initiative at the precise moment when the Flint Public Schools faced its largest, most intractable crisis.
Given the timing of the announcement, many residents wondered if there was a connection between the onset of desegregation and the cancellation of community education. Was the withdrawal of financial support an indication of the foundation's opposition to desegregation? Did the decision have anything to do with the fact that, by the mid-1970s, the proportion of black pupils in Flint's 42 elementary schools had risen to 50%, well beyond the "tipping point" at which whites typically fled big city schools?
71 Despite widespread demands for answers to such questions, Mott officials remained largely silent about their reasons for withdrawing support from the public schools. In fact, beyond explaining that the move would somehow empower city leaders and residents to solve their own problems, foundation personnel provided almost no additional information to the public regarding their decision. Clearly, though, segregation had been a defining feature of the community education programso much so, in fact, that Mott officials may well have canceled the initiative to avoid complying with federal desegregation demands.
Although no concrete evidence supports a connection between the federal desegregation proceedings and the end of community education, Mott, Manley, and other trustees of the foundation were, without question, committed segregationists. During the 2 decades preceding his death in 1973, Mott was an uncomfortable witness to the civil rights revolution. In 1956, as southern resistance to the Brown ruling was congealing in the US Congress, Mott wrote warm letters of support to well-known segregationists such as Senator James Eastland of Mississippi, urging defiance. "I agree with all that you said, including 'State Rights' and Constitution," Mott informed the senator. "Certainly I agree with all that you said regarding the Negro Question."
72 Like Eastland, Mott opposed the Brown decision, viewing it as an unconstitutional assault on states' rights and racial gradualism. 73 As civil rights protests intensified during the 1960s, Mott continued to reach out to segregationists. During the summer and fall of 1965, for instance, Mott exchanged cordial letters regarding community education and other matters with George Wallace, Alabama's segregationist governor. 74 Mott authored his letters to Wallace just weeks after Alabama state troopers had assaulted peaceful voting rights protesters in the city of Selma. Mott avoided the harsh language and tactics of Wallace and other demagogues, and he seldom spoke publicly about racial matters, but his personal commitment to Jim Crow ran deep, and his work in Flint's schools was an outgrowth of his belief that segregation was an essential prerequisite for community building and civic unity. Like Mott, Manley abhorred involuntary desegregation, once stating, "I am one of the kind that thinks that this busing is for the birds."
75 There is no question, then, that the two men most responsible for designing and overseeing Flint's system of community education were committed to maintaining the color line. Anything beyond voluntary, gradual desegregation-and any proposal that undermined the city's prized neighborhood schools-threatened to destroy the delicate social fabric that Manley and Mott had spent much of their lives weaving.
Despite their disappointment over the end of the Mott program, elected leaders from the board of education continued to champion community schools policies and actively resisted federal desegregation demands during the 1970s. Like William Early and Donald Riegle, most board members blamed housing for school segregation, arguing, "Segregation is basically the result of housing patterns, economic factors and social mores once widely accepted."
76 Although by the 1970s black voters had succeeded in electing several African-American candidates to the nine-member board of education, these new leaders were unable to shift the course of the desegregation dispute.
77 Ultimately, board members voted to accept only a limited desegregation plan that relied upon magnet schools and other forms of voluntary desegregation. With few exceptions, however, white parents-many of them surely driven by their fondness for community education-chose to send their children to segregated neighborhood schools over magnet programs. In a school district that had already lost thousands of white pupils to suburban and private school systems, Flint's voluntary, city-only program could not and did not achieve integration.
78 Instead, the resolution of the federal desegregation proceedings signaled the triumph of the gerrymandered school and neighborhood lines that, for nearly 50 years, had formed the heart of a segregated system of community education.
Conclusion
From the perspective of the early twenty-first century, segregation in the United States has been both remarkably durable and remarkably broad, cutting across multiple areas of social, cultural, and economic life. Understanding that durability requires attending not only to the powerful impact of segregation as splitting, but to the more subtle forms and rationales of segregation as joining.
Segregationists such as Charles Stewart Mott and officials from the Flint Board of Education proceeded from a complex, interlocking web of motivations, justifications, and ideologies. They sought to preserve property values by splitting citSchools, Housing, and the Many Modes of Jim Crow ies and dividing people, of course. Yet they also hoped to bring people together within the walls of segregation. Indeed, Mott, Frank Manley, and many other supporters of community education from throughout the nation began with the principle that social solidarity, civic order, and neighborhood stability (alongside an unstated but deep commitment to white power and privilege) depended on racial separation. Segregation, they agreed, was a prerequisite to their cherished goal of community building. This is a key reason why Charles Stewart Mott flatly opposed the Brown ruling, why Frank Manley opposed busing, and, most importantly, why local education officials continued to practice government-sponsored segregation throughout the postwar and civil rights eras.
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Motivated by a shared belief in the principle of segregationist joining, school board officials in Flint and nationwide worked tirelessly to maintain the color line. They collaborated with local homebuilders and federal mortgage underwriters to create segregated neighborhood units, gerrymandered attendance districts when black families desegregated all-white residential areas, built temporary schoolhouses to avoid transferring white students to black schools, manipulated student transfer rules to keep schools homogeneous, and resorted to innumerable other methods to preserve and extend racial separation.
However, the strength and breadth of their work has been largely lost to history. Among the many reasons for this omission, the powerful narrative of de facto segregation stands out. When African Americans and others demanded an end to separate and unequal schools, education officials in Flint and other communities shifted the blame for segregation onto actors in the private sphere, claiming that any racial imbalances in their districts were the result of morally and constitutionally innocent forms of de facto segregation. Segregated schools, they added, were attributable not to the actions of local school boards, but rather to discrimination in the private housing market. In truth, however, education officials played a central role in upholding residential and school segregation together, in the name of joining as well as splitting.
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Over the past generation, scholars have thoroughly dismantled the notion that segregation derived primarily from the private acts of racist individuals. However, most historians of metropolitan segregation have done so by focusing primarily on the government's role in maintaining residential Jim Crow. Within this impressive corpus of literature, schools are virtually absent. Even when schools do appear in the literature, though, they generally appear in isolated chapters or vignettes and seem to have few, if any, connections to housing. 81 The truth, however, is that the multiple modes of Jim Crow in modern America, far from existing in isolation, have always formed a complex web in which schools, housing, urban development programs, and other entities constantly interact. Those interactions, as the Flint case suggests, helped to facilitate a wave of community-building initiatives during the middle decades of the twentieth century. However, the expansive public culture that white joiners built during those years was inseparable from the magic lines of Jim Crow that divided people by skin color.
Despite historical evidence of the many interactions between housing and schooling in shaping segregation, much popular discourse has and continues to treat the two issues separately. This same separation has long been apparent in legal and legislative reforms that address either housing policy or school policy but rarely consider the two together. 82 Today, voices that call for housing desegregation (either in whole or in part) for the purpose of school desegregation could benefit from this history-a history that identifies clear links between housing and schooling as a continuation of a long tradition of public and private choices that have often served to maintain the color line. 83 Despite its checkered history, community education has proven to be a remarkably durable concept. In recent years, in fact, there has been a growing embrace of the idea of the "community school." 84 The term now has a variety of connotations, but it often identifies schools as logical hubs for social services that support but extend beyond education, everything from legal advocacy and family counseling to adult education. Although contemporary proponents of community education tend to justify their ideas more in terms of student academic success than in the 1930s-era talk of community ethos, the two iterations of "community schools" still share some common features in that both seek to foster broader and deeper connections between schools and the neighborhoods that surround them. With the history of segregationist community schooling in mind, contemporary advocates would do well to think carefully about how defining community schools in relationship to specific local geographies and to claims of specific need by neighborhood may at once provide important services and yet create both practical and symbolic supports for continued patterns of segregation by race and class.
Notes
